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the FishesA key question about animal group decision making is which conditions
promote shared or unshared decisions. A recent experiment on sticklebacks
demonstrates a compromise solution: turn-taking.Redouan Bshary
Imagine a situation where a woman
and a man would like to go out
together rather than each going out
alone because they disagree over
where to go: to the ballet or to
a football match. This classic scenario
of the ‘battle of the sexes’ game [1]
has hitherto received little attention
when it comes to exploring the
evolution of cooperation. In this
issue of Current Biology,
Harcourt and colleagues [2]
describe an ingenious experiment
on three-spined sticklebacks in which
pairs are confronted repeatedly with
a battle-of-the-sexes problem.
Sticklebacks solve the conflict of
interest by taking turns in leading the
partner to the respective preferred
sites, much like humans do [3].
Theoreticians typically explore
cooperation using the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma game [4]. In this
two-player game, partners can
either cooperate or defect. Mutual
cooperation yields a higher payoff than
mutual defection but defecting yields
higher payoffs than cooperating in
each single round, independently of
the partner’s behaviour. This payoff
structure causes maximal conflict of
interest between potential partners.
However, conflicts may be reduced
in many potentially cooperative
interactions where joint actions are
invariably superior to mutual defection.
The prime example are species living
in groups where individuals are
selected to stay together even
though individuals may disagree over
activity and movement patterns. Such
disagreements naturally emerge asa consequence of different dietary
needs and different optima for the
trade-off between foraging efficiency
and the risk of predation, depending on
age or sex [5]. The battle-of-the-sexes
game captures the key problem of such
situations.
Recently, the question of how group
decisions are made has received
immense interest, providing both major
conceptual advances and new
empirical evidence [6]. Nevertheless,
some classic studies are worth
mentioning as they are easily
overlooked. For example, a long-term
field study on hamadryas baboons
demonstrated both individual
leadership and majority-voting [7,8]:
males coerce their harem females into
following [7], while male harem owners
voted at which waterhole they would
meet later in the day before splitting
up when leaving the common sleeping
places [8]. A study on bar-headed
geese demonstrated that an
individual’s competence may also be
important (parents lead when the
goslings are still very young), while
under certain circumstances an
individual’s need for food (females prior
to the reproductive period, and older
nestlings in their important growth
phase) may make it a leader in the
group [9,10].
Based on the geese data,
Lamprecht [11] developed the first
conceptual ideas about the emergence
of leadership by combining the
battle-of-the-sexes game with the
‘war-of-attrition’ game [12]. In this
latter game, individuals compete over
a resource by investing time in order to
obtain it, and an individual emerges as
the winner if it is willing to persist longer(i.e. to incur greater costs) than its
opponent does. The combination of the
two games resolves a major limitation
of the original battle-of-the-sexes
game, which is that partners cannot
communicate. In the framework, an
individual emerges as leader if it can
accept larger separation distances
than the partner, because it values
the proximity of a partner less or values
the access to another resource more
than its partner does. The idea that
variation in needs may lead to
persistent leadership was also
supported in much more formal
mathematical terms [13].
The key question in recent years has
been under which circumstances
group decisions are shared or
unshared [6,13–17]. Empiricists
working on large anonymous
aggregations predominantly found
evidence for shared decision making
[15], while evidence on small structured
groups like hamadryas baboon harems
or geese families suggests scope for
unshared decisions. Clearly, what is
needed at this stage are controlled
experiments to identify key parameters
that may favour either shared or
unshared decision making. The studies
on stickleback pairs by Harcourt and
colleagues [2] provide a prime example
of what can be learned from such
experiments. In a recent study, they
found that bolder stickleback
individuals tend to make unshared
decisions about foraging excursions
when a pair faces the trade-off
between foraging and safety and
hence have to decide when to go
foraging [18]. In the current study [2],
they additionally created a conflict of
interest over where to go, effectively
creating a battle-of-the-sexes problem.
Under these circumstances, variation
in boldness became unimportant.
Instead, turn-taking emerged as the
solution under these new conditions.
First, fish were individually trained to
locate food at one of two possible
positions. Then individuals that had
learned opposing locations were
Dispatch
R71paired. During the experiments, no
food was present and individuals could
monitor each other’s movements.
Under these conditions, each individual
initiated excursions to the food site it
had been trained to visit. The
probability that the partner followed
was highest if the fishes alternated
visits between the two food sites. Thus,
turn taking in leadership was crucial to
achieve high levels of coordination. The
emergence of turn-taking is particularly
surprising as the level of conflict over
where to go was actually rather low:
each fish would inspect both sites
regularly even in the absence of the
partner, with less than overall 60% of
excursions to the baited site.
In conclusion, the key merit of the
study by Harcourt et al. [2] lies in the
ingenious general design of an
experimental setup that allows the
variation of potential key variables and
to test how this variation affects group
decision making. Until now, the setup
has been used to test coordination
between two individuals that can
communicate through monitoring each
others’ movements. However, with
some imagination one could vary the
experimental setup by reducing theability to communicate and, even more
interestingly, by increasing group size
and then test how decisions are made
depending on the nature of conflict.
Also, the setup seems to be adaptable
to other taxa. No doubt that further
exciting new evidence will come soon.References
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